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1.  Introduction  
Shadow or hidden economic activities have attracted attention of both researchers and 
politicians for more than quarter of a century. Most of the studies have dealt with the issue of 
estimating the aggregate size of shadow economies around the world. Although a large body 
of literature
1 on macro aspects of the hidden or shadow economy exists, the sectoral and 
micro characteristics of the shadow economy still remain unsearched. Turkey is certainly no 
exception for this. There have been quite a few studies
2 on the measurement of the size of the 
overall shadow economy in Turkey but the sectoral characteristics of the phenomenon still 
need attention. The goal of this paper is to provide a first but still preliminary insight into the 
determinants of the informal hiring using data gathered from the textile sector in Turkey. 
Profit-maximizing firms base their decisions on a number of factors. These factors 
might be economical such as premiums the firms need to bear when they decide to employ 
formally or stem from legal environment in which the firms operate such as detection 
possibility and severity of penalty if detected when they decide to employ informally. There 
are some factors that can be considered as supply-side ones such as skill composition of the 
workers in the sector, the others as demand-side ones such as competitiveness in the sector. It 
is obvious that that these factors might contribute to informal hiring decisions of firms in 
different degrees depending on the sector the firms operate in. The textile sector in Turkey, as 
discussed in the paper in detail, is considered one of the most important sectors in creating 
employment and inducing export. Ihe sector is also known to have a large informal part in it, 
it is labor-intensive, and the textile firms are mostly small and medium sized. Ownership 
structure of the firms is also likely to enhance their decisions on informal hiring: Many firms 
have relatives among owners so these tight relations might increase their ability to act 
contrary to the related laws without getting detected. These features make the sector an 
interesting and good field in a research of this kind aiming to unveil the determinants of 
informal hiring. 
                                                           
1 Literature on the subject of the “shadow,” “underground,” “informal,” “second,” “cash,” or “parallel,” 
economy has been increasing. Various topics––measurement, causes, effect on the official economy––are 
analyzed. See for example, survey publications: Frey and Pommerehne (1984); Thomas (1992); Loayza (1996); 
Pozo ed. (1996); Lippert and Walker eds. (1997); Schneider in Brandstaetter and Güth eds. (1994a); Schneider 
(1994b); Schneider (1997); Schneider (1998); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997); Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b); Belev (2003); Gerxhani (2003); 
Pedersen (2003). For an overall survey of the global evidence of the size of the shadow economy see Schneider 
and Enste (2000); Schneider and Enste, (2002); Schneider in Rowley and Schneider eds. (2003); Schneider 
(2005a, 2005b); Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004).  
2 See, for example, Kasnakoğlu (1993); Temel, Şimşek and Yazıcı (1994); Yayla (1995); Öğünç and Yılmaz 
(2000); Savasan (2003). The size of the overall (total) shadow economy of Turkey (calculated by Savasan and 
Schneider (2005)) is: 1999/2000: 32,1; 2001/2002: 33,2; 2002/2003: 34,3; 2003/2004: 34,8; 2004/2005: 35,2   21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    3 
The data used in this paper is likert type survey data whose questionnaire is exhibited 
in the appendix. Likert scaling targets to uncover the agreement levels of the respondents of 
the survey to some predetermined statements. For instance, respondents are asked whether 
they think that ‘in the textile sector, informality is high’. The respondents choose the best 
agreement level they think they fit in. In this paper, the five-point likert scaling from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree or one being neutral is used.                      
In section 2, we discuss informal hiring with emphasis on the Turkish textile sector. In 
section 3, we provide an empirical/econometric analysis of the determinants of informal 
hiring with special emphasis to the country’s textile sector. The goal of this empirical analysis 
is to bring about some more insight into the labor and sectoral characteristics of the shadow 
economy in the textile sector in Turkey. For the empirical analysis we use ordered and logistic 
regressions and discriminant analyses. Finally in section 4, a summary and some conclusions 
are given. 
 
2. The Informal (Shadow) Economy in the Turkish Textile Sector 
2.1 The Scope of the Informality in Turkey 
Under informality we understand the production of legal goods and services in the shadow 
economy avoiding to pay taxes and social security contributions and violating labor market 
laws. Informality is considered to be a large and growing part of the shadow economy in 
developing countries and, most of the time, is linked to the small and medium sized 
enterprises. The State Institute of Statistics in Turkey attempts to collect data on informal 
sector using censuses (first carried out in 1927) and labor force surveys (first carried out in 
1966). But more technical and better defined data collection on the sector started in 1998 with 
the Household Labor Force Survey. Since then the survey has been repeated every two years. 
The State Institute uses some criteria to determine informality such as workplace and type of 
tax payment. It takes mobile workplaces (registered or not registered) and fixed workplaces 
employing less than five persons as informal sector participants. According to tax payment 
criteria, lump-sum tax payers, self-employed and employer hiring less than five workers, and 
unregistered people are considered as participants in the informal sector (Özel, 1996: 182-
191). Another working definition is given by Tansel (2001): Wage earners not covered by any 
social security program are informal sector workers
3.     
                                                           
3 This definition is followed in this study. The firms have been asked if they hire workers without social 
insurance; if the informality (number of employees uninsured) is high in the sector and what motivates the firms 
to hire informally. See the questionnaire in the appendix.   21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    4 
In Turkey, people are covered by three different social security organizations
4: The 
Pension Fund (PF) providing coverage for civil servants, the Social Insurance Organization 
(SIO) providing coverage for employees of the state owned and private enterprises, and BAĞ-
KUR providing coverage for self-employed. Using these three organizations, the PF creates 
no problem with respect to informality because it serves civil servants. But the other two 
include only part of the population they intend to cover. Their participants, especially those of 
the SIO have the opportunity to enter the system and get out easily. According to official 
statistics from the State Planning Organization of Turkey, the insured-labor force ratios range 
from 44 percent in 1994 to 51 percent in 2001. Needless to say these ratios are quite low and 
provide some clue for the extent of the informality in Turkey. These ratios are likely to go up 
when working age population is taken into account because some of the people at working 
age are not registered into labor force. 
 
2.2 The Textile Sector in Turkey and the Determinants of Informal Hiring 
2.2.1 The Textile Sector in Turkey and Its Relevance to the Shadow Economy   
In Turkey the textile sector plays an important role in employment, production and export. 
The sector’s share in registered employment is about 11 percent (Varol, 2005: 1,12). The 
sector’s share in GDP has been more than 10 percent for a long time. According to DPT, the 
Planning Institute of Turkey, textile sector has assumed a high share of the total export in the 
country ranging from 25% in 1982 to 42% in 1997 (Report by the Textile Commission, 2001: 
12). Some other numbers also show the sector’s role in export: Turkey’s textile related export 
is about 7.5% of GDP in 2003 (IMF Country Report No 05/163, May 2005: 35).  
In the literature, one can find many estimates of the shadow economies using different 
methods for almost every country.
5 We believe that specific inquiries into labor and sectoral 
characteristics of this phenomenon have the potential to provide some additional insight. 
From this perspective this paper focuses on the determinants of the informal hiring. To do so, 
it chooses the textile sector. This choice of the sector is driven by the following facts: (i) The 
textile sector in Turkey has a large informal part; (ii) ownership structure of this sector is 
family oriented (e.g., there are relatives among owners) and (iii) it contains mostly small and 
medium sized enterprises.    
Anecdotal evidence and some discussions indicate that the informal employment is 
high in the sector. For instance, Varol (2005; 1-12) discusses that when informal employment 
                                                           
4 These three organizations were merged in April, 2006 in an effort to reform the social security in Turkey, the 
results of which are yet to be seen. 
5 Compare e.g. Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2005). 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    5 
is taken into account the sector’s share in employment goes up to 20 percent from 11 percent. 
If these estimates have some scientific  validity (considering the difficulties involved in 
estimating) informal employment is somewhere around 50 percent of the total employment in 
the sector. 
As in many developing countries in Turkey the textile sector is shaped mostly by small 
and medium sized enterprises (SME’s); as well as family owned and operated enterprises 
which are also very common.  These features become apparent in the results of the survey 
conducted in 2005 displayed in tables 1 and 2. The ratio of the firms that have relatives 
among owners is about 67 percent. This feature might affect informal hiring positively or 
negatively: On the one hand, owners might get around the laws and regulations because they 
have tight relationships to their relatives; thus, these firms might hire more informal workers. 
On the other hand, this type of relationship may result in more “official” hiring from relatives, 
because employers might be more willing to pay insurance premiums for their relatives than 
to other foreign employed workers..   
Table 1: Ownership Structure of the Firms in the Textile Sector  
“Any relatives among owners”  Frequency Percent
Yes  371 67.3 
No  180 32.7 
Total  551 100,0 
Source: The frequencies are calculated from the responses 
for question 1 of the questionnaire displayed in appendix I. 
 
Table 2 displays the firms’ size in the sector, following EU classification (Çolakoğlu, 
2002: 3-8): Of the firms in the textile sector interviewed, 30 percent is considered ‘micro’ (in 
table 2 micro I and II), 44.2 percent ‘small’ (in table 2 small I), 19.1 percent ‘medium’ (in 
table 2 small II and medium). Only 6.7 percent of the firms are in the categories of ‘high 
medium’ and ‘big’.      
Table 2: The Sizes of the Firms in the Textile Sector  
Number of 
Employee 
Classification Frequency  % Cumulative 
% 
0-4   Micro I  100 15.2  15.2 
5-9 Micro  II  98 14.8  30.0 
10-49 Small  I  292 44.2  74.2 
50-99 Small  II  57 8.6  82.9 
100-250 Medium 69 10.5  93.3 
250 +  High- medium 
and big 
44 6.7  100.0 
Total  660 100.0   
Source: The frequencies are calculated from the responses for question 2 of the questionnaire displayed in 
appendix I. 
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To sum up, the three most distinct features of the textile sector in Turkey are the 
following:  
(1) The informality in the sector is high;    
(2) more than two third of the firms are family-owned and   
(3) the firms in the sector are mostly SME’s.    
These three features motivated us to apply the questionnaire in the appendix to the textile 
sector to unveil the determinants of informal hiring. 
 
2.2.2 The Determinants of Informal Hiring 
From our theoretical reasoning and the institutional knowledge about the Turkish textile 
sector we can distinguish the following six hypotheses why informal hiring work takes place:   
(1) It is widely agreed that informal hiring is more common in the small and medium 
sized enterprises, and in firms where the owners are not relatives of the employees, 
ceteris paribus. 
(2) The higher the competition in the textile sector is, the more likely is the hiring of 
informal labour, ceteris paribus. 
(3) If the supply of labor exceeds the demand for labor, employers hire labor with lower 
wages heuce pay no taxes and social security contributions, ceteris paribus. 
(4) The textile sector uses labor-intensive technologies, where not much skill from the 
worker is required. Hence, as low skilled workers are easily available in Turkey, 
informal hiring easily will take place, ceteris paribus. Also, the rather high labor cost 
of the “official” textile sector is an important element which provides a strong 
incentive for the firms in the textile sector to hire informally. The “official” labor cost 
of the textile sector in Turkey is $2.14 per hour, which is high, when compared with 
other countries: the cost of labor per hour is $1.89 in Tunisia, 1.92 in Morocco, $0.6 in 
India and $0.61 in China; it is $2.52 in Poland and $16.65 in Italy (Report by the 
Textile Commission, 2001: 13), just to quote two developed countries. 
(5) High insurance premiums (pensions on health care) paid by the firms increase the 
labor cost of the firm motivating them to hire informally, ceteris paribus. In Turkey, 
the social security premiums/payments are found higher than many OECD countries 
as seen on table 3. The ratio of social security contributions to average employee wage 
cost was about 17 percent in 1999 and rose to 31 percent in 2000. The employer share 
also went up from 10 to 18 percent. The figures for Turkey seem higher than most of 
the OECD countries.  21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    7 
(6) The probability of detection and the extent of the punishment after detection will 
affect the decision of the firms planning to hire informally, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 3: The Ratios of Social Security Contributions to Average Employee Wage Cost, 
Selected OECD Countries, 1999 (%) 
Country Employee  Employer Total
Australia  2 0 2 
Canada  5 6 11 
Denmark  11 1  12 
Japan  9 9 18 
Luxembourg  12 12 24 
Netherlands  25 14 39 
New Zealand  0 0 0 
Poland  21 17 38 
South Korea  6 8 14 
Switzerland  10 10 20 
Turkey (1999)  7 10  17 
Turkey (2000)  13 18 31 
United Kingdom  7 8 15 
United States  7 7 14 
Source: OECD; Taxing Wages, 2000 Edition  
   
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Data and Survey Design 
The survey (i.e. the questionnaire) is displayed in the appendix and uses Likert scaling to 
collect data. The responses are scaled from 1 to 5, 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ with the 
statement and 5 being ‘strongly agree’. The responses show whether the participants are 
favorable or not to the statements and to what degree. However, it is impossible to determine 
the difference between the responses since the choice and the number of the response 
categories are chosen arbitrarily. That is, we cannot treat the difference between a 3 and a 2 
the same as that between a 2 and a 1. They represent only a ranking. 
The participants of the survey indicated their agreement with each of the nine item 
using the 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Table 4 
shows the marginal percentages of the statements that ask the owners of textile firms about 
their own and the sector’s behaviors in informal hiring. 
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Table 4: The Marginal Percentages of the Response Categories for the Statements about 




Strongly disagree  52  10.6 
Disagree 98  19.9 
Neutral 61  12.4 





    Strongly agree  118  24.0 
Total   492  100.0 
Strongly disagree  25  5.2 
Disagree 53  11.0 
Neutral 35  7.3 





Strongly agree  235  48.9 
Total 481  100.0 
Source: The marginal percentages are from the survey conducted in 2005, whose questionnaire is displayed in 
the appendix.   
 
The percentages of the different possibilities to answer of the two statements in the 
table 4 display a distinct feature: It shows that only 78 firms out of 481 firms interviewed 
disagreed to some extent (cumulative frequencies in percentages of ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly 
disagree’ responses) with the statement ‘the firm never hires informally’. That is, only 16.2 
percent of the firms state that they do hire informally. This percentage is much lower than 
expected, especially when compared with the percentages for the statement “In the sector, 
informality is high”. There, agreement with the statement goes up to 57 percent, a percentage 
which is in line with some previous findings (e.g. Varol, 2005). Hence, it seems obvious that 
people, if directly shed to their own situation, answer quite differently compared to a more 
general question on stigmatized topics such as tax evasion and informal hiring.   
 
3.2. Estimation Models and Empirical Findings  
  Now we proceed with the empirical analyses of our survey data and the underlying 
theory using three techniques: ordered and logistic regressions and discriminant analyses. 
Before discussing the results a few words on the independent variables are useful: Informal 
hiring in the sector (‘SECINFOR’) depends on a number of independent factors:  
(1) the ownership structure of the firm labeled as ‘RELATIVE’ (whether owners are 
relatives),  
(2) the size of the firms (‘SIZE’),  
(3) degree of the competition in the sector (‘COMPETITION’),  
(4) social security payments ‘PREMIUMS’,  21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    9 
(5) detection probability (DETECTION) when a firm hires informally and is detected a 
penalty is the consequence (‘PENALTY’), and  
(6) the skill composition of the labor in the sector (‘UNSKILLED’).  
  The expected sign of the independent variable ‘relative’ is ambiguous. It can be argued 
that tight relationship between owners and employers owners might provide opportunity to act 
contrary to the laws and regulations, resulting in more informal hiring. On the other hand, this 
ownership structure might result in more official employment of their relatives providing 
them with better working conditions (e.g. health coverage, retirement benefits). The size of 
the firms in the textile sector can be considered as an important determinant of informal 
hiring. In the literature, informal employment has been taken one of the most important 
characteristics of the small and medium sized enterprises, hence the expected sign for 
coefficient ‘SIZE’ is negative, i.e. if the firms get larger (smaller) informal hiring gets lower 
(higher). The textile sector is a sector in which high competition is observed both in Turkey 
and in the world. Heavy competition might force the firms to hire informally if they find the 
opportunity; hence the expected sign for the coefficient COMPETITION is positive. High 
insurance premiums for social security will also increase informal hiring. The expected signs 
for the coefficients of the variables DETECTION and PENALTY are negative, implying that, 
if firms are intensely audited and severely punished when detected, informal hiring will be 
reduced. Skill structure of the employees in the textile sector might affect the employees’ 
bargaining power with employers. As employees get more (less) skilled they have better (less) 
chance to fight for insurance. So the expected sign for ‘UNSKILLED’ is positive. 
 
3.2.1 Results of Ordered and Logistic Regressions 
The ordered regression model is based on the notion that there is some latent continuous 
outcome variable, and that the ordinal outcome variable arises from discretizing the 
underlying continuum into ordered groups. The basic form of the model is laid out in the 
following equation; 
] ... [ ) ( 2 2 1 1 ip p i i j ij X X X link β β β θ γ + + + − =     (1) 
where link(.) is the link function
6; ) (γ
ij is the cumulative probability of the j
th category for the 
i
th case;    j θ  is the threshold (cutoff value) for the j
th category;  1 i X  … ip X are the values of the 
predictors for the i
th case and 1 β … p β are regression coefficients.   
                                                           
6 We employed different link functions readily provided by SPSS package in search of better model. As 
discussed in SPSS, there is no theoretical background as to which function to be used. The ordered regression 
model predicts a function of the actual cumulative probabilities. More discussion on the ordered regression 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    10 
  The models use the predictor variables to calculate predicted probabilities of 
membership in the categories for each case. The main focus of the model is on the parameter 
estimates of the independent variables. Table 5 shows the parameter estimates, their 
significance and fit statistics from two ordered regressions. Model I exhibits the results when 
all five response categories are used. Model II exhibits results when the responses showing 
disagreement and agreement to some extent (the sums of ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ 
and of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’) are collapsed into two large categories. The dependent 
variable labeled as ‘SECINFOR’ is response categories to the statement ‘in the sector, 
informality is high’.   
As far as the signs and significances of the parameters are concerned we can identify 
three common findings of the models: 
 1) In model I the firm’s size and intensity of penalty for informal hiring are 
quantitatively important as well as the variables COMPETITION and UNSKILLED. The first 
two variables both have negative signs (as expected) and are statistically significant at 5 
percent significance level. These results tell us that as firm size (labeled as ‘size’) and 
perceived penalty get larger probability of informal hiring gets lower.  
2) In all models competition in the sector “forces” the firms to find ways to reduce the 
costs. The sign of that predictor’s coefficient is positive as expected and statistically 
significant at five percent.  
3) In all models the coefficient for the predictor labeled as ‘unskilled’ is positive and 
statistically significant. It basically tells us that in this sector unskilled labour is hired 
informally because they do not have bargaining power over employers to get social security 
insurance. 
 
Table 5: The Ordered and Logistic Regression Results 
Models 
Ordered Regression  Variables 




























Constant     -2.248***
(0.779) 
Relative -0.127  -0.202  0.048 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
models can be found in SPSS, Daykin and Moffatt (2002) and Greene (1997).     21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    11 






































Model Fitting Information  110.635*** 114.948*** 100.9*** 
Pseudo R
2 (Cox and Snell)  0.201  0.208  0.225 
In ordered regressions, the cutoff values, produced by the model, define the categories and are estimated by the 
thresholds (constants). They depend only on which category’s probability is being predicted and are not affected 
by the values of the predictor variables. The SPSS program uses the Wald Statistic to test the null hypothesis that 
a coefficient value is zero in the population.  
Model fitting information provides the log likelihood values for the intercept only 
(baseline) model and the final model with the predictors. The difference of log-likelihoods 
can be interpreted as chi-square distributed statistics. The significant chi-square statistics 
indicates a significant improvement over the baseline model. The model here, as suggested by 
the significant chi-square statistics, shows significant improvements. That is, the model gives 
better predictions than guesses based on the marginal probabilities for the outcome categories. 
How much better is the model really? The pseudo R-squares are not very high, implying that 
the model is only partially successful in predicting the outcome categories. Another way to 
discuss the success of the model is to compare the predicted outcome with the actual data. 
Table 6 shows the cross table for the response categories. The ordered regression model 
seems somewhat successful in predicting the actual responses correctly ranging from about 40 
percent to 72 percent. 
 
Table 6: The Cross Table for Response Categories from Ordered Regression          
Predicted Group Membership (%)   “In the sector,  
informality is high"  Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree
Strongly disagree  46.2  17.3  30.8  5.8 
Disagree 2.0  39.8  52.0  6.1 














Strongly agree  1.7  5.9  52.5  39.8 
Using an ordinal dependent variable, the important matter is the ordering of categories 
which can be quite arbitrary. Thus, two similar categories can be collapsed into one (larger) 
category. To do so, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ responses are collapsed to make a common 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    12 
category for the responses which reveal that the firms agree with the statements in different 
degrees. The same is done for the responses revealing disagreement with the statements in 
different degrees. The model II in table 5 exhibits the results of the ordered regression after 
collapsing the four into two categories. The empirical results are quite similar as the results 
from model I. However, the coefficients for SIZE and PENALTY become insignificant while 
those for competition and unskilled remain significant. There is little but some improvement 
of the explanatory power of the regressors. 
We also uses a logistic regression model to identify the important determinants of the 
informal hiring in the Turkish textile sector, the findings are presented in table 5. The logistic 
model is suitable when the dependent variable consists of categories. We recoded the data into 
two large categories: 0 when the response showed disagreement to some extent with the 
informal hiring statement, 1 when the response showed agreement to some extent with the 
statement. The signs of the coefficients of the independent variables are the same as those 
from the ordered regression models except for that of the independent variable ‘RELATIVE’, 
but the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant from all three models. The 
coefficients of the variables COMPETITION and UNSKILLED from logistic regressions are 
positive and significant at 1 percent level. Since these estimated coefficients are on a log scale 
their interpretation is somewhat different from those from ordinary regressions: The 
coefficients mean that being one unit higher in agreement level with the related statements 
increases the log odds of being in informal hirer category by 0.579 and 0.354, respectively. 
 
Table 7: The Cross Table for Response Categories from Logistic Regression 




Disagree 79  64  55,2  Observed 
Agree 28  225  88,9 
Overall Percentage  76,8 
Table 7 shows overall “hit rate” of about 77 percent which is a considerable 
improvement over the rate one could get by a pure random assignment which is 50 percent. 
The correct prediction for the statement showing agreement with the informal hiring is about 
89 percent. 
3.2.2 Disciriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis is used to classify cases into the values of a categorical 
dependent variable. Given a set of independent variables, discriminant analysis attempts to 
find linear combinations of those variables that best separate the groups of cases. The 
procedure supplied in SPSS automatically chooses a first function that separates the groups as 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    13 
much as possible. It then chooses other functions that are both uncorrelated with each other 
and provide as much further separations as possible. A discriminant analysis can be 
formulated as follows: 
ip pk i k k ik X b X b b d + + + = ... 1 1 0      (2) 
where  ik d  is the value of the k
th discriminant function for the i
th case, p is the number of 
predictors (or discriminating variables), bjk is the value of the j
th predictor, Xij is the value of 
the i
th case of the k
th predictors. The number of functions separating the groups equals min(#of 
groups-1,# of predictors). If the discriminant function analysis is effective for a set of data, the 
classification table of correct and incorrect estimates will yield a high percentage of correct 
estimates. 
In this paper we provide two discriminant analyses, one with all five response 
categories from strongly disagree to strongly agree, the other with only two categories, 
disagree and agree. In the analysis utilizing all response categories, there are four functions 
“estimated”, and the results are shown in tables 8 and 9. As indicated in table 8, the 
eigenvalue for the first function is 0.325, 10 times larger than that for the second function. We 
get smaller eigenvalues toward the fourth function. Since the size of the eigenvalue is related 
to the discriminating power of that function we demonstrate that among the four, the first 
function has the highest discriminating power and especially the third and the fourth functions 
are very weak indeed. This result is better seen when we check the functions’ contributions in 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable. Functions 1 and 2 together account for 
96.5% of the explained variance. Checking the canonical correlations summarizing the 
degrees of associations between the groups and the discriminating functions, we see, that it is 
the largest for the first function (0.495).  
 
 
Table 8: Canonical Correlations and Test of Significance  
Function  Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % Canonical Correlation
1 0.325 87.9 87.9 0.495
2 0.032 8.6 96.5 0.176
3 0.010 2.7 99.2 0.099
4 0.003 0.8 100.0 0.055
Test of Function(s)  Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig.
1 through 4  0.722 157.801 28 0.000
2 through 4  0.957 21.485 18 0.256
3 through 4  0.987 6.237 10 0.795
4 0.997 1.489 4 0.82921/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    14 
All four functions have a joint chi
2 157.8. with an associated p value of less than 1 
percent. This demonstrates an overall level of discriminatory power that is unlikely to be 
random. The Wilks's lambda of 0.722 indicates that the functions account for 27.8% (1-0.722) 
of the variance of the intensity of the agreement with informal hiring statement. The other 
tests of functions show no statistical significance. All of this suggests that only one function is 
required rather than the four that are available in principle. 
    Table 9 shows the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients. All the 
signs are as expected and in line with the findings from ordered and logistics regressions. 
Ignoring the signs, COMPETITION makes the greatest contribution in determining the 
dependent variable on function 1. UNSKILLED, PREMIUM, and PENALTY are next in the 
rank. The structure coefficients for each discriminator tells us how closely variables and 
functions are related. A very large absolute magnitude of a coefficient (closer to 1) indicates 
that the function is carrying nearly the same information as the variable. The values for 
COMPETITION and PREMIUM are 0.877 and 0.669, respectively. 
Table 9: Standardized Discriminant and Structure Coefficients
1 
 Standardized  Canonical   
Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Structure 
Coefficients 
Variables  Model I  Rank  Model II  Rank  Model I  Model II 
RELATIVE -0.026 7 0.024  7 0.024  0.055 
SIZE -0.126  5  -0.059  6  -0.297  -0.261 
COMPETITION 0.651  1  0.669  1  0.877  0.865 
PREMIUM 0.178  3 0.168 3 0.669  0.641 
DETECTION -0.100  6  -0.061  5  -0.097  -0.106 
PENALTY -0.144  4 -0.116 4 -0.050  0.009 
UNSKILLED 0.408  2  0.448  2  0.628 0.652 
1  Model I and II refer to discriminant analyses with all response categories and with only two categories, 
respectively. 
As seen in table 10, the percentage of the ‘known’ cases which are correctly classified is 
about 46. This hit rate is a considerable improvement over the correct prediction rate one 
could get by pure random assignment. However, the correct prediction rates for every 
category are not the same; i.e. the overall success in correct prediction is not achieved 
throughout the categories. 
Table 10: The Cross Table for Response Categories from Discriminant Analysis. Model 
I    
Predicted Group Membership % 
"In the sector. informality is high"  Strongly 
disagree  Disagree Neutral Agree  Strongly 
agree 
Strongly disagree  31.0  26.2  1.2  25.0  16.7 
Disagree 7.7  35.9  0.9  45.3  10.3 
Neutral 10.3  16.7  2.6  60.3  10.3 














Strongly agree  2.7  4.0  0.7  53.0  39.6 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    15 
45.9% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 43.2% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified. 
In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
Model II refers to the discriminant analysis in which the categories of the levels of the 
agreement are collapsed into two large categories, the case, where only one function is 
available. The function is found to be significant at 1 percent level with the chi
2 value of 
127.6. Canonical correlation is found to be 0.51. The Wilks's lambda of 0.741 indicates that 
the function accounts for 26% of the variance of the level of the agreement with informal 
hiring statement. As seen in table 8, the contributions and the signs for the discriminators 
under model II seem to follow those under model I, in which all of the response categories are 
used together. An overall hit rate of about 78 percent is achieved with model II as shown in 
table 11. This rate seems reasonably higher when compared with 50 percent one could get 
with pure random assignment. 
      
Table 11: The Cross Table for Response Categories from Discriminant Analysis. Model 
II 
Predicted Group Membership % "In the sector. informality is high" 
Disagree Agree 
Disagree 58.7  41.3  Observed % 
  Agree 12.1  87.9 
77.7% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 76.6% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified. 
Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the 
functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
 
To conclude: the methods employed in this paper to analyze the survey data seem to 
reach similar results. The ordered and logistic regressions and the discriminant analyses all 
produce the expected signs and achieve quite an improvement in predicting observed 
outcomes over pure random assignment.   
 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
Informal work might stem from the supply and/or demand conditions in the “official” 
labor market. In this paper, the determinants that motivate the firms to hire informally have 
been analyzed. The textile sector has been chosen because this sector is relatively labor 
intensive and shadow economy activities are higher. The firms hiring informally (e.g.. hiring 
without insurance) base their decision on a number of factors which are related to either 
supply-side or demand-side conditions.  
The conclusions to be drawn from the ordered regressions are as follows: Among the 
determinants of informal hiring, the size of the firms, the severity of penalty after detection, 
competition and skill composition of the labor are found statistically significant. The 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    16 
estimated coefficients of the first two independent  variables are negative, implying that 
possibility of hiring informally decreases as the size of the firm gets larger and the amount of 
the perceived penalty gets higher. The coefficients of the latter two are positive, implying that 
competition within the textile sector and the characteristics of unskilled labor increase 
informal hiring in the sector. All coefficients resulted from the logistic regression have 
expected signs and competition and skill level of employees in the textile sector are found to 
affect informal hiring positively and significantly. Discriminant analysis demonstrates that 
competition, skill level of employees, high premiums, and penalty rate make the greatest 
contributions in determining the informal hiring in Turkish textile sector. 21/06/2006 Studien\Savasan\InformalHiringTurkey_21062006.doc    17 
5. Appendix: The Questionnaire 
1) Any relatives among owners? 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
“In the sector. hiring is easy”         
“My firm never employs informally”          
“In the sector. informality is high”         
“Competition in the sector forces to employ informally”          
“High premiums force the firm to hire informally”         
“It is easy to find workers ready to work without insurance”         
“Workers in the sector without insurance are unskilled”          
“In the sector. firms are scanned frequently for uninsured 
workers” 
       
“High penalties for hiring without insurance make informal 
work  difficult”  
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